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INTRODUCTION
It is a commonplace to recall that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) integrated civil and political rights (CPR)
with economic, social, and cultural rights (ESCR), and that the two
International Covenants separated them.
* François-Xavier Bagnoud Professor of Health and Human Rights, Harvard School of
Public Health.
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Reflecting Cold War divisions, stress on one or the other of these
two traditional categories tended to reveal preferences for neo-liberal
or social democratic understandings of human rights, when it was not
more blatantly reflective of competition between the NATO and
Warsaw Pact (plus ―Non-Aligned‖) countries, a sort of North–West
vs. East–South ideological split. This article explores how the separation of categories of rights has lost its pertinence in the first
decade of the 21st century. My purpose is to show how the separation
into two categories is perhaps a convenient taxonomy for some, but
subject to serious challenge from the perspectives of political history,
the theory of rights, and contemporary policy.
While human rights are accepted as universal because of the
resonance of the underlying principles with all major religious and
philosophical traditions, many of the assumptions underlying the
separation of economic, social, and cultural rights from civil and
political rights derive from interpretations of the philosophical ideas
and revolutionary practices of 18th century Europe and America.1 A
few reminders of the legacy of that period may dispel the historically
inaccurate claim that those rights falling within today‘s category of
economic, social, and cultural were unknown to the Enlightenment
and absent from the French Declarations of the 18th century.
First of all, to the extent that the essence of these rights is
distributive justice or the exigencies of equality, they are echoed in
the second element of the revolutionary triad (―liberté, égalité,
fraternité”). Surprising though it may be to anyone who assumes the
Enlightenment was exclusively about liberty from state abuse, it
should be recalled that, in the mind of many representatives of the
Third Estate—the representatives of the commoners and the
bourgeoisie in the Estates-General, which became the Constituent
Assembly, and promulgated the Declaration on the Rights of Man
and the Citizen in August 1789—human rights began with the rights
we call today economic, social, and cultural. Abbé Sieyès, representative of the Third Estate from Nemours in the Estates General,
presented a theory of human nature based on the fulfillment of human
needs: ―Man is, by nature, subject to needs; but, by nature, has the
means to satisfy them. . . . Individual means are linked by nature to

1. See Stephen P. Marks, From the “Single Confused Page” to the “Decalogue for Six
Billion Persons”: The Roots of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the French
Revolution, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 459 (1998).
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individual needs. Whoever is responsible for needs must therefore
freely dispose of the means.‖2 He further discussed various forms of
inequality and explained that a purpose of society is to develop the
moral and physical capacities of its members which it augments
through the ―inestimable collaboration of public works and assistance.‖3 His draft declaration of rights of February 17894 refers to
―natural and social rights,‖ including the human right of each citizen
―unable to satisfy his needs to the assistance of his fellow citizens.‖5
In a remarkably progressive analysis, anticipating class analysis of a
century later, the introduction attributes the ―war between the
government and the nation, or more exactly between the government
and the people‖ to ignorance and greed. It seeks to go beyond the
cessation of abuse of power and ameliorate ―all social relations‖ and
―establish the reign of justice among all the different classes of
citizens.‖6 After a first article stating the right to do freely what does
not harm others, the Nemours draft declaration of rights enumerates
what we call today welfare rights: the right to assistance from others;
free assistance to children, the weak, and disabled; non-interruption
during work; adequate salary for work; and the right to keep what one
legitimately acquired through work, donation, or inheritance. Only
after these rights come protection against violence, expropriation, and
violations of liberty, property, security, and rules of criminal due
process. Then come provisions on income taxes and finally freedom
of expression. The second chapter of the Nemours draft is devoted to
public education, which must be ―highly favored‖ by the state.7
Thus, although the Declaration of 1789 is limited in its concern with
equality to matters of taxation and property, the concerns of equality
and social justice were voiced, and might have found expression in
the text had more time been spent on it. The Dictionnaire Critique de
la Révolution Française notes that, while the Declaration of 1793
contains explicit social rights, ―almost half of the drafts of 1789
include assistance, even work, among the primordial guaranties that a

2. Abbé Sieyès, Préliminaire de la Constitution, Reconnaissance et Exposition Raisonnée
des Droits de l‘Homme et du Citoyen (July 20–21, 1789), reprinted in STÉPHANE RIALS, LA
DÉCLARATION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DU CITOYEN 591, 593–94 (1989) (translation by
author).
3. Id. at 595–99 (translation by author).
4. Id. at 550–55 (translation by author).
5. Id. at 605 (Article XXV) (translation by author).
6. Id. at 551 (translation by author).
7. Id. at 555 (translation by author).
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collectivity owes to its members.‖8
This heritage, along with the achievements of European socialism
and of the Soviet Union, influenced the drafting of the Universal
Declaration. Albert Verdoodt wrote:
Mr. Cassin took advantage of his background as an eminent
jurist and his special talent for reconciling the liberalism of the
French Declaration of 1789 and the socialism of modern
constitutions, especially that of the USSR. He succeeded in
maintaining, in the declaration, both all the traditional rights
and the new socio-economic rights.9
According to John Humphrey, the Canadian U.N. staff member
who contributed to the drafting of the Universal Declaration, his own
draft ―attempted to combine humanitarian liberalism with social
democracy.‖10 The direct impact of the socialist countries on the text
is most noticeable in the provisions on duties to society and on
economic, social, and cultural rights.11 It was not exclusively the
Soviet bloc delegates that insisted on including these rights in the
Universal Declaration. Indeed, several delegates referred to Roosevelt‘s Four Freedoms (1941), which included freedom from want on
a par with freedom from fear, freedom of religion, and freedom of
expression.12 The United States had even proposed an international
bill of human rights in 1942, which states in Article I that the purpose
of government was common welfare in an interdependent world, and
in Article II that ―[a]ll persons . . . have the right to enjoy such
8. DICTIONNAIRE CRITIQUE DE LA RÉVOLUTION FRANÇAISE 121–22 (François Furet &
Mona Ozouf eds., 1988) [hereinafter Dictionnaire Critique]. The Declaration of 1793 gave
explicit reference to the rights to social protection and education. Article 21, for example,
refers to public assistance as a ―sacred debt‖ and affirms that society must provide for the
subsistence of unfortunate citizens either by finding work for them or by assuring a means of
existence for those unable to work.
9. ALBERT VERDOODT, NAISSANCE ET SIGNIFICATION DE LA DÉCLARATION UNIVERSELLE
DES DROITS DE L‘HOMME 49 (1964) (translation by author). As was pointed out supra,
Verdoodt is not entirely accurate in considering social and economic rights as ―new.‖
10. JOHN P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE 40 (1984).
11. ANTONIO CASSESE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORLD 42 (1990). Cassese adds
the reference to the role of individuals ―as members of society,‖ for example, in Article 22
on social security, and the exclusion of activities contrary to the purposes and principles of
the U.N. (Article 29(3)) or destructive of rights (Article 30).
12. Cassese points out, drawing on leading historians, that Roosevelt meant by freedom
from want—an expression he borrowed from a journalist—the elimination of certain cultural
and commercial barriers between nations, rather than its current meaning of realization of
economic, social, and cultural rights. Id. at 30.
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minimum standards of economic, social and cultural well-being as
the resources of the country, effectively used, are capable of
sustaining.‖13 Eleanor Roosevelt‘s motivation for including economic, social, and cultural rights was, of course, the welfare commitments of her husband‘s administration and his proclaiming of
freedom from want among the Four Freedoms. However, it was also
to avoid the Soviet Union taking credit for the inclusion of these
rights, for which its delegate argued long and hard. William Korey
explains that ―she must have been aware that socialist principles were
being advanced and implemented in numerous Western societies. To
have resisted this trend would have abdicated leadership in the
international community to the Soviet bloc, which was already
trumpeting its strong advocacy of economic, social and cultural
rights.‖14 As Mary Ann Glendon notes, ―[c]ontrary to later belief, the
countries within the Soviet sphere of influence were neither alone nor
the most vigorous in pushing for the inclusion of social and economic
rights. . . . [N]o nation opposed them in principle.‖15
While Eleanor Roosevelt maintained that economic, social, and
cultural rights could not be regarded as justiciable in the same way as
civil and political rights, she agreed to their inclusion in the Universal
Declaration. However, Latin American delegates were particularly
forceful about the inclusion of these rights, as was René Cassin of
France. The views expressed in the debate and the placement of
these rights in the overall arrangement of the articles nevertheless
reveal a lower ranking than civil and political rights, which is similar
13. It is also worth recalling that President Roosevelt, in his State of the Union Message
of 1944, said that:
We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot
exist without economic security and independence. ―Necessitous men are not free
men.‖ People who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships
are made. In our day these economic truths have become accepted as self-evident.
We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of
security and prosperity can be established for all—regardless of station, race, or
creed.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, Message to Congress on the State of
the Union (Jan. 11, 1944), in 13 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 40–42 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950). See also Philip Alston, U.S.
Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Need for an
Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT‘L L. 388 n.99 (1990).
14. William Korey, Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
in ELEANOR ROOSEVELT: HER DAY 21 (A. David Gurewitsch ed., 1973).
15. MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 185 (2001).
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to the French revolutionary declarations. Post-1948 developments in
the U.N. have considerably expanded the normative and institutional
space for economic, social, and cultural rights.
A combination of Western traditions going back at least to the
French Revolution, reflected in numerous national constitutions of
the late 19th and early 20th centuries, in the 1919 International Labour
Organization (ILO) constitution, in Roosevelt‘s second bill of rights,
and in the draft international bill of rights prepared by a committee of
the American Law Institute, on the one hand, and socialist thinking
and the legal system of Soviet-bloc countries, on the other, made it
possible for the 1948 text to contain both sets of rights. The doctrine
of their equal value has been a canon of the United Nations ever
since, in spite of practice to the contrary. That canon is reflected in
numerous statements of U.N. bodies,16 General Assembly resolutions,17 and notably the declaration issued at the close of the World
Conference on Human Rights in 1993, which proclaimed: ―All
human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights
globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the
same emphasis.‖18 The significance of this canon for the traditional
separation of categories of human rights calls for a rethinking of the
rationale behind the decision of the General Assembly in 1951,
―largely on ideological grounds,‖19 that the Commission should draft
separate covenants for each of the groups of rights. Already in 1950
Mrs. Roosevelt had felt obliged by the ―growth of isolationism and
16. For example, a UNDP policy paper has outlined UNDP‘s strategy for integrating
human rights into sustainable human development and called for a ―universal and holistic
[approach], stressing the indivisibility and interrelatedness of all human rights—economic,
social, cultural, civil and political.‖ U.N. Development Programme, Integrating Human
Rights with Sustainable Human Development, at 16 (Jan. 1998), available at
http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/HR_Pub_policy5.htm.
17. As early as December 4, 1950 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 421E (V),
U.N.Doc. A/1775, affirming that ―the enjoyment of civil and political freedoms and of
economic, social and cultural rights are interconnected and interdependent. . . . [W]hen
deprived of economic, social and cultural rights man does not represent the human person
whom the Universal Declaration regards as the ideal of the free man.‖ In a 1977 resolution,
the General Assembly enumerated the concepts which should guide all future work of the
U.N. on human rights, including ―equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to
the implementation, promotion and protection of both‖ categories of human rights. G.A.
Res. 32/130, ¶ 1(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/32/130 (Dec. 16, 1977).
18. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993).
19. HUMPHREY, supra note 10, at 107.
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anticommunism‖ at home to favor including only civil and political
rights in the Covenant.20 The U.K. lost interest and eventually the
General Assembly reached its decision to have the Commission draft
two covenants, to be treated equally and opened for signature on the
same date. As Mary Ann Glendon describes it, ―[i]n practical terms
the move made sense, but separating the political/civil liberties from
the social/economic rights had a heavy cost: it undercut the Declaration‘s message that one set of values could not long endure
without the other.‖21
Two decades after the end of the Cold War, the distinctions are
disappearing in theory and practice. The traditional distinctions were
based on several philosophical and practical considerations, ranging
from the concept of negative and positive rights to resource
allocations and institutional issues. On closer examination of the
rationale for separating categories of human rights, we can identify—
at the risk of oversimplifying—four philosophical or conceptual
features and four practical or policy-based features
I. CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN
CATEGORIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The conceptual bases relate to immutability, cultural bias, role of
the state with respect to positive and negative rights, and political
ideology favoring freedom or equality.
A. Immutability
At the theoretical level, the case is often made that civil and
political rights are permanent and immutable, and are not subject to
changing circumstances as they relate to the permanent nature of
human beings. Those who hold this view stress the priority of civil
and political rights for human life and dignity, which are timeless,
compared to economic, social, and cultural rights, which are
conditional on societal development and programmatic realization
over time. This theory is strongly influenced by natural law, which
attributes the permanence of human rights to the natural condition of
human beings—that is, all humans have the same nature and
therefore the same rights. Since human nature does not change, then
neither do human rights. A second feature of natural law supportive
20. GLENDON, supra note 15, at 196.
21. Id. at 202.
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of permanence of rights is the derivation of rights from natural
justice, from an abstract appeal to Reason, or from a belief that these
rights are ―God-given‖ or correspond to the Will of a Divine
Presence (for those who adhere to an organized religion), or the Will
of an abstract Deity (for those who adhere to the deist position).
From all these perspectives, it is inconceivable that the definition of
virtue as derived from these forces greater than humans would
change over time, although the ability of human to apprehend the
higher Will may be perfected.
The strength of the arguments for permanence based on human
nature depends on a belief in an abstract and unknowable source of
justice accepted as a matter of faith rather than the scrutiny of
scientific investigation. The concept of human nature, however, has
a place in the study of evolutionary biology and human behavior.
The question for evolutionary biology is whether there is a
comparative reproductive advantage of propensities such as empathy
and altruism, which would explain the emergence of codes of human
social behavior such as human rights. There may be genetically
determined basic human instincts of survival of the species and
manifestations of empathy and altruism that evolutionary biology is
only beginning to explain.22 Since human evolution is driven by
reproductive selﬁshness, one could wonder why the human species
would develop any ethical system, like that of human rights,
according to which individuals manifest feeling for the suffering of
others (empathy) and—even more surprising—act in self-sacriﬁcing
ways for the beneﬁt of others without achieving any noticeable
reproductive advantage. And yet, as Paul Ehrlich notes in Human
Natures, ―empathy and altruism often exist where the chances for any
return for the altruist are nil.‖23 Natural selection does not provide
the answer to moral behavior as ―there aren‘t enough genes to code
the various required behaviors,‖ but rather ―cultural evolution is the
source of ethics‖24 and therefore of human rights.
The second scientific approach to understanding human nature
holds that moral behavior is a human, social product developed by a
process of biological and social evolution (associated with Hume, and
also sentimentalist, subjectivist, or naturalistic approaches) or as a
22. See PAUL R. EHRLICH, HUMAN NATURES: GENES, CULTURES,
PROSPECT 305–31 (2000).
23. Id. at 312.
24. Id. at 317.

AND THE
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sociological pattern of rule setting (as in the sociological theory of
law and the work of Weber). This approach includes the contractarian notion that individuals in a society accept rules from
legitimate authority in exchange for security and economic advantage
(as in Rawls). In legend, literature, religion, and political thought,
justice and eventually the concept of human rights became socially
constructed over time into complex webs of social interaction striving
toward a social order in which human beings are treated fairly as
individuals and collectivities. The best-known histories of the human
rights movement25 tend to begin with the ancient religions and
societies and trace the evolution of understanding of human rights
over time, reinforcing the idea that moral codes evolve with
circumstances.
Whether one uses a biological or a sociological lens to discern the
origin of human rights in society, it is indisputable that the content of
the norms evolves over time. Slavery, torture, and subjugation of
women and colonized populations are among the most obvious
practices that were regarded as natural and just for long periods of
human existence. Clear human rights norms have emerged in recent
times to exclude these practices from acceptable human behavior.
Thus, this progressive awareness of new understandings of acceptable treatment of humans and exigencies of social arrangements,
including legislation and enforcement, explains the changes over time
of the catalogue of civil and political as well as economic, social, and
cultural rights. Given these explanations of the evolution of human
rights norms, there is no basis for considering that one category
reflects values more timeless than the other. It is tempting to cite life
and bodily integrity as so basic that they have always been protected
in human society and that certain social benefits or cultural practices
are only recently regarded as deserving of protection, but history
teaches us otherwise. The social norm of caring for the needy has a
long history while the prohibition of deliberate infliction of pain to
obtain information is relatively recent, thus upending the assumption
that civil and political rights are constant and economic, social, and
cultural are ―new.‖ It is therefore disputable to justify the distinction
between categories of rights on the relative permanence of the one
compared to the other.
25. See PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
VISIONS SEEN (2d ed. 2003); HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, (1950).
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B. Cultural Bias
Another justification for the distinction between categories is
based on cultural or civilizational bias, the concept of the autonomous individual being characteristic of Western modernism and
requiring that civil and political rights protect that autonomy, in
contradistinction to other civilizations that value the group, whether
the Asian values of duty to the family and king (state), or the
dictatorship of the proletariat in societies that claim to be communist,
or communal values in African societies. From this perspective, civil
and political rights are Western and made part of constitutional
democratic regimes and of the expectations of the citizens, although
they may be exported to other societies that are modernizing, either
by building new nations out of a colonial legacy, which made them
familiar with these rights, or in responding to the pressures of
globalizing markets and ideas, as in China, and adapting their legal
practices and constitutional norms as a result. According to this
view, a priority may have been placed on economic, social and
cultural rights in non-Western societies either because it is the duty of
the beneficent Asian king (and the successor state) to provide for his
subjects, or because the dictates of charity in the religion or belief
system of the society, or because the victory of the proletariat in the
class struggle so requires.
However, this approach, which has been articulated in the ―clash
of civilizations‖ thesis, tends to consider large zones of human
habitation as excessively monolithic. Drawing on a classification of
civilizations as Western, Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic,
Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Japanese, Samuel Huntington argues
that ―individualism remains a distinguishing mark of the West among
twentieth-century civilizations.‖26 Huntington considers the Western
―tradition of individual rights and liberties unique among civilized
societies.‖27 He agrees with Bilahari Kausikan of Singapore that the
West, which ―wrote the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,‖ has
lost its leverage, especially over Asian countries.28 Huntington‘s
thesis is flawed in several respects. First, as Thomas Franck points
out, he erroneously assumes that the most radically conservative
26. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF
WORLD ORDER 71 (1996).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 194; see also Surya Prakash Sinha, The Axiology of the International Bill of
Human Rights, 1 PACE Y.B. INT‘L L. 21, 31–52 (1989).
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manifestations of non-Western civilizations accurately represent them
and that occidental culture is inherently liberal and tolerant.29 The
reality is that non-Western civilizations are quite diverse in practices
and beliefs and that ―autonomy and freedom of conscience are not
any more indigenous to the West than to the East.‖30 Moreover,
many Westerners ―probably not only do not oppose, but actually
share with non-Western societies a commitment to community-based
values and identity.‖31 In other words, in all societies there is a
spectrum of individualistic and communitarian attitudes,32 and
conflicts of values occur within as well as across civilizations.
Second, Huntington neglects the authenticity of activists in people‘s
movements in non-Western societies who espouse human rights
without rejecting their own culture. Human rights activists from nonWestern societies may find it more effective within their culture to
seek change at the community level rather than through state
institutions, as in the West, but such preferences are a matter of
strategy based on cultural realities not on the inappropriateness of the
human rights framework for their struggle for social justice. Former
human rights activist and later South Korean President Kim Dae Jung
rejected the ―Asian values‖ argument of former Singaporian Prime
Minister Lee Kuan Yew, which he found ―not only unsupportable but
self-serving.‖33 For him, the Universal Declaration ―reflects basic
respect for the dignity of people, and Asian nations should take the
lead in implementing it.‖34 ―The biggest obstacle [to establishing
democracy and strengthening human rights in Asia] is not its cultural
heritage but the resistance of authoritarian rulers and their apologists.‖35
The debate over the cultural bias of human rights has not been laid
to rest by these or other voices. A vast amount of official pronouncements and scholarly exegesis can be marshaled on either side
of the debate. The question for the purpose of challenging the
excessive distinction between categories of rights is whether this
29. Thomas M. Franck, Is Personal Freedom a Western Value?, 91 Am. J. Int‘l L. 593,
608 (1997).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 604.
32. Id. at 605.
33. Kim Dae Jung, Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia’s Anti-Democratic Values, 73
FOREIGN AFF. 189, 190 (1994).
34. Id. at 194.
35. Id.
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claimed bias is related to civil and political rights as being Western,
and economic, social, and cultural rights as being non-Western. The
Cold War obfuscated the debate as the West used international fora to
criticize the stifling of freedom of expression, religion, movement,
assembly, the denial of political rights, and the practice of arbitrary
arrest and detention in socialist countries, while the latter denounced
the contradictions of Western capitalism as responsible for the lack of
economic, social, and cultural rights and the prevalence of racial
discrimination in the West. The reality is, of course, more complex.
Most significant for present purposes is the long tradition in the West
of supporting these rights, including Roosevelt‘s proposing a second
bill of rights to cover them,36 and broad ratification of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) (the United States being the only major Western country
not to ratify it). In education and the media, it must be said that the
United States is behind most countries on developing awareness of
human rights, and it is rare to find issues of health, social security,
food, and shelter articulated as matters of human rights, except by
progressive social movements. However, a survey shows that most
of the public ―‗strongly‘ believe meeting people‘s basic needs of
food, housing, and healthcare should be considered human rights.‖37
The fact that the U.S. is behind other countries diplomatically does
not justify the conclusion that culturally Americans do not understand
access to basic health, education, food, and housing as a matter of
human rights. In other Western countries, the problem does not even
arise. In sum, it is not accurate to consider that economic, social, and
cultural rights are not suitable to the West due to cultural notions of
the nature of rights and should therefore be treated differently from
civil and political rights.
C. Role of the State in Realizing Positive and Negative Rights
The third set of conceptual bases for the distinction between
traditional categories of human rights has to do with the role of the
state and the notion of negative vs. positive rights. According to this
perspective, civil and political rights are attributes of the human
36. See Roosevelt, supra note 13.
37. Belden, Russonello & Stewart Research & Commc‘n, Human Rights in the U.S.:
Findings from a National Survey, (2007) at 4, available at http://opportunityagenda.org/files/
field_file/Human%20Rights%20Report%20-%202007%20public%20opinion.pdf (last visited Apr.20, 2009).
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person with which the state must not interfere, and thus are best
described as ―freedoms from state interference‖ or ―droits-attribut,‖
while economic, social and cultural rights are ―claims on the state,‖
or ―droits-créance.‖ Civil and political rights are ―negative‖ insofar
as they enjoin the state from interfering in the individual‘s freedom to
do whatever is not harmful to others, whereas economic and social
rights are correlative to positive duties of the state to enable the
individual to do what he or she would like to do.38 The former imply
abstention of the state while that latter imply claims against the state
for provision of services.
Although intellectually appealing in its neatness, this distinction
tends to oversimplify the process of realizing rights in practice. First
of all, considerable intervention by the state is necessary to achieve
civil and political rights, including action to ensure that private
parties do not violate the rights of others, and to give agents of the
state the wherewithal to train and equip internal security forces so
they can acquire information and confessions without resorting to
torture, and to establish and maintain a system of courts and public
defenders‘ offices necessary for a fair hearing and adequate legal
defense. Merely ―abstaining‖ cannot fulfill the state‘s duties under
the social contract.
The distinction between positive and negative rights is not the
same as that between negative and positive liberty. In his famous
essay on ―Two Concepts of Liberty,‖ Isaiah Berlin treated the idea of
negative liberty as referring to an individual being left to act or be as
he or she pleases without interference of other persons, whereas
positive liberty involved either the collective self-determination of
the space of freedom, as in a democratic system, or control or
mastery of someone else who determines the scope of one‘s actions.39
Closely related to this distinction was the assumption that positive
freedom was associated with authoritarianism and paternalism, and
the Cold War perception in the West that the Soviet Union was
claiming to realize positive freedom but was in fact totalitarian and

38. This distinction was brilliantly argued by Quincy Wright in his contribution to a
collection of philosophical essays produced by UNESCO to assist the drafters of the
Universal Declaration. Quincy Wright, Relationship Between Different Categories of
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: COMMENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 143, 147 (UNESCO
ed., Greenwood Press 1973) (1949).
39. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, Inaugural Lecture before the University of
Oxford (Oct. 31, 1958), reprinted in ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY 166 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002).
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repressive, hence non-liberal. The issue today is not whether to
choose between positive and negative freedom but whether to attach
practical consequences to the distinction between negative and
positive human rights.
Negative rights are somewhat akin to negative liberty in the sense
that their enjoyment requires inaction on the part of others, whereas
positive rights require action on the part of the duty holder. Thus
civil and political rights, such as freedom of speech, the right to vote,
or the right to physical integrity, require abstention on the part of the
state from banning speech, restricting voting rights, or abusing the
person of a citizen. Poverty, ignorance, illness, inability to bargain
for the price of one‘s labor under conditions of exploitation, social
inequalities, stigma, discrimination and similar factors are as constraining on an individual‘s liberty to be or act as he or she wishes as
banning a publication or speech or assaulting or arbitrarily detaining
a person. The realization of human rights requires positive action to
lift such constraints, such as providing education, protecting from
discrimination, or regulating the labor market. In this sense,
economic, social and cultural rights are instrumental to negative
freedom.
Similarly, there are negative duties implied in the proper realization of many economic, social and cultural rights. Article 15 of
the ICESCR on the right to take part in cultural life and to enjoy the
benefits of scientific progress and its applications refers to ―the right
to freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activity.‖40 Leaving aside the material conditions necessary for the artists
or scientists to be productive, the freedom to which that paragraph
refers is a negative freedom.
In the 1980s, Henry Shue provided a fairly systematic refutation of
the claim that there are sharp and significant distinctions between
positive and negative rights. For him, ―neither rights to physical
security nor rights to subsistence fit neatly into their assigned sides of
the simplistic positive/negative dichotomy,‖ demonstrating ―that
security rights are more ‗positive‘ than they are often said to be‖ and
―subsistence rights are more ‗negative‘ than they are often said to
be,‖ and he concludes that the distinctions, ―though not entirely

40. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 15(3), Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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illusory, are too fine to support any weighty conclusions.‖41
Rather than seek to redress the balance by enumerating negative
freedoms in ESCR and positive freedoms in CPR, it is more productive to draw on the practice of the past twenty years of
interpreting the normative content of all human rights in terms of
three types of obligations or duties, which are less abstract and more
grounded in practice, namely, the obligations to respect, protect, and
fulfill, the latter sometimes subdivided into the duties to facilitate and
provide. While this typology emerged with respect to defining
obligations under the ICESCR,42 the obligations approach is even
more relevant as a framework that applies equally to ESCR and CPR
since it underscores that the state has duties that vary from preventing
its agents from committing violations (duty to respect), and holding
third parties accountable (duty to protect), to extending services (duty
to fulfill) through information (duty to facilitate) and furnishing what
otherwise cannot be obtained (duty to provide). Such duties cannot
be reduced to negative and positive obligations; they lead to a range
of policy preferences for any right, regardless of category. The ban
on torture calls for (a) state agents not to torture, (b) the state to
prevent private torture, (c) the state to train law enforcement officers
to collect information without torture, and (d) considerable
investment in providing a functioning prosecutorial and penal system
adequate to eliminate the temptation to torture. Similarly, health as a
human right implies (a) duties on state agents not to discriminate in
access to health services, (b) regulation over private health providers
to meet various exigencies of this right, as well as (c) prevention and
promotion campaigns, and (d) a state duty to provide certain services
not met by the private sector or required in circumstances of severe
deprivation or epidemic. Clearly, it is far too simplistic to limit the
realization of freedom from torture to the negative obligations ((a)
above) of state agents and of the right to health to the positive
obligation ((d) above) to provide health services. In many specific
instances the important developments in civil and political rights
might relate to positive obligations and those in economic, social, and
cultural rights to negative duties. There is, of course, merit in the
distinction between state abstention and state intervention as applied
41. HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 37
(2d ed. 1996).
42. See generally M. MAGDALENA SEPÚLVEDA, THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (2003).
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to the two categories of human rights; however, there are sufficient
crossovers among positive and negative rights for this distinction not
to justify the claim that there is a difference in nature between the
two groups.
D. Political Ideology Favoring Freedom or Equality
Related to the previous conceptual basis for the distinction is the
underlying philosophical basis for rights, expressed in terms of
―freedom‖ or of ―equality‖ and the corresponding ideological underpinnings.
The ―revolution of freedom‖ refers to the historical response to the
arbitrary exercise of power by the monarchy in 18th century Europe.
It is the powerful idea that underlies both the establishment of the
First Republic in France and the independence of the American
colonies from the British Crown in the New World. This is the
response to the ―long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing
invariably the same Object [which] evinces a design to reduce them
under absolute Despotism‖ to which the Declaration of Independence
refers. The 1789 French Declaration was based on the belief that
―the ignorance, neglect, or contempt of the rights of man are the sole
cause of public calamities and of the corruption of governments.‖
Out of this tradition there have emerged both the libertarian and
liberal sets of political beliefs and action. Adherents of the former
stress that ―America was founded on the idea of Liberty; however
oppressive the present statist government of America is, America and
Liberty are one and the same.‖43 The preoccupation with liberty of
18th century France had to do primarily with what the Old Order
lacked: tolerance for ideas (thought, conscience, religion, expression,
and the press), parliamentary representation, and fair criminal justice.
The most articulate and passionate voices in 1789 were those who
defended liberty defined as ―the freedom to do everything which
injures no one else,‖ according to article 4 of the 1789 Declaration.
That text also defined the ―natural and imprescriptible rights of man‖
as ―liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.‖ (Article
2.) The 1793 Declaration defined these rights as ―equality, liberty,
security, and property,‖ (article 2), and liberty as ―the power that
belongs to man to do whatever is not injurious to the rights of
43. Nation of Liberty Official Website: Home of the Libertarian Revolution, http://www.
geocities.com/CapitolHill/Congress/3999 (last visited Apr. 17, 2009).
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others,‖ (article 6).44
A libertarian analysis of the Universal Declaration by Frank van
Dun accepts the understanding of human rights similar to that of the
French Declaration of 1789, the American Bill of Rights, and
Locke‘s Second Treatise in UDHR Articles 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
16, and 17, but has serious problems with the economic, social, and
cultural rights in Articles 22 through 28. The Universal Declaration
mistakenly presents these ―simply as human rights, as if they are of
the same nature and on the same level as other rights, with their
seemingly respectable ancestry,‖ according to van Dun.45 ―Anyone
familiar with the classical doctrine of natural rights,‖ he continues,
―will see . . . that the UD‘s distinctive ‗rights‘ are incompatible with
that doctrine.‖46 The UDHR reads, for him, like ―an original
manifesto of the philosophy of the welfare state.‖47 The claims on
resources posed by such ―rights‖ are intolerable for the real rights
since ―a person‘s life, liberty, and property are thrown upon the
enormous heap of desirable scarce resources to which all people are
said to have a right.‖48 Such ―rights to‖ are incompatible in this view
with natural rights and he therefore rejects the idea ―that one‘s rights
are as unlimited as one‘s desires, and, thus, are the primary sources of
conflict and disorder.‖
A more classical liberal approach to human rights, such as that
represented by Maurice Cranston, also finds reason to treat CPR as
real rights and ESCR as aspirations.49 It has been the official position
of the government of the United States, alone among Western
democracies, to find the whole category of ESCR as so different in
nature from CPR as not to be human rights at all. The ideological
significance of this position is to reinforce the separation of
categories and to resist the redistribution objective of the perceived
ideological enemy of equality.
The political ideology favoring the ―revolution of equality‖ also
finds its roots in the French Revolution. That momentous event is a

44. 1793 CONST. arts. 2, 6 (Fr.).
45. Frank van Dun, Human Dignity: Reason Or Desire? Natural Rights Versus Human
Rights, 15 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 1, 5 (2001).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 7.
48. Id. at 10.
49. Maurice Cranston, Human Rights, Real and Supposed, in POLITICAL THEORY AND
THE RIGHTS OF MAN 43–53 (D.D. Raphael ed., 1967).
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constant reference point for the development of Marxism, whether in
The Jewish Question, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,
The Civil War in France, or Critique of the Gotha Program. Marx
referred to the ―gigantic broom of the French Revolution of the
eighteenth century,‖ which ―swept away all these relics of bygone
times,‖ i.e., ―all manner of mediaeval rubbish, seigniorial rights.‖50
From the grand Socialist History of the French Revolution by Jaurès51
to the socialist and libertarian Lutte des Classes sous la Première
République by Daniel Guérin52 and the writings of Albert Soboul and
Georges Lefebvre, the French Revolution has been a preferred
subject of scholarship for the left, until the revisionism of the last
twenty years, which was in vogue during the bicentenary in 1989.
The historiography of the French Revolution is inseparable from the
development of socialist thought and its critiques. Socialist and
social democratic ideas galvanized the revolutions of 1848, 1871, and
1917. The drafters of the UDHR were aware of those ideas and the
provisions on economic, social, and cultural rights in numerous
European and Latin American constitutions.
The ―revolution of equality‖ is indeed that part of the revolutionary
tradition that challenged the privileges of those who dominate in
society through titles and wealth. There is, of course, a strong
egalitarian theme in the liberal tradition and an abhorrence of
arbitrary abuse of state power among most socialists. Do their
differences justify keeping two categories of human rights separate?
It is only the extreme views of liberty that would reject equality, and
of equality that would suppress freedom; most political philosophies
on the right and the left allow for a balancing of both in a broad
ideological middle-ground between the libertarian rejection of all
welfare as theft, at the one extreme, and the dictatorship of the
proletariat at the other. Contemporary human rights continues to
provide legitimate aspirations for greater equality in states built on
strong liberal traditions and for greater freedom in states that have
provided strong support for the material needs of the population. The
―social and international order‖ to which Article 28 of the Universal

50. KARL MARX, THE CIVIL WAR IN FRANCE, reprinted in part in MODERN POLITICAL
THOUGHT: READINGS FROM MACHIAVELLI TO NIETZSCHE 874 (David Wootton ed., 1996).
51. JEAN JAURÈS, HISTOIRE SOCIALISTE DE LA RÉVOLUTION FRANÇAISE (Albert Soboul
ed., Éditions Socials 1969) (1924).
52. DANIEL GUÉRIN, LA LUTTE DES CLASSES SOUS LA PREMIÈRE RÉPUBLIQUE 1793–1797
(2d ed. 1968).
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Declaration refers is one that presumably would temper the excesses
of any regime, whether ideologically to the left or the right; it would
call for political prisoners to be released from Cuba, while acknowledging that country‘s high levels of achievement in education and
health and call for universal health coverage and greater equality of
access to quality education in the United States, while hailing the
protections available to citizens against arbitrary exercise of power.
The value of a holistic approach to human rights is to favor both
freedom and equality in proportion to the democratically determined
preferences of each society. Maintaining separate categories of rights
for each ideological preference undermines that approach.
II. POLICY-BASED DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN CATEGORIES OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
The practical or policy-based distinctions between the two
categories of rights concern implementation, justiciability, violations,
and resources. The assumption underlying the separation of rights of
the UDHR into two covenants was primarily practical, although
philosophical distinctions were voiced. The practical reasoning for
treating some rights as categorically different from others began with
a consideration of the appropriate means of implementation.
A. Implementation
Thus, civil and political rights were deemed to be immediately
enforceable, whereas economic, social, and cultural rights were
deemed to be subject to progressive implementation. The core
obligations set out in Article 2 of each Covenant reflected this
distinction, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) specifying that ―[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant,‖ and that an effective remedy be provided in case
of violation; and the ICESCR stipulating that ―[e]ach State Party to
the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with
a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized in the present Covenant.‖ This difference in implementation is, moreover, the principal reason why the Commission on
Human Rights decided to draft two Covenants rather than one.
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However, at the national level, there is little doubt that states
confront practices and imbedded habits that make it difficult to take
this distinction too literally. Where prosecutors and law enforcement
officials lack training and incentives to abide by human rights rules
governing treatment of offenders, the full realization of the rights not
to be subjected to torture or arbitrary arrest or detention calls for
progressive measures. The same is true for the independence of the
judiciary and the process of free and fair elections. These institutions
require efforts over generations to be up to the task of full respect for
the related civil and political rights. This obvious fact does not mean
that acts of torture, mistreatment, and denial of justice or free and fair
elections do not violate national and international norms. They do.
But they must be seen in the context of progressive measures taken to
improve the system.
Similarly, the progressive implementation of ESCR is now understood by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as
requiring: (a) that the rights in question be exercised without
discrimination;53 (b) that the state comply with a ―minimum core
obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum
essential levels of each of the rights;‖54 and (c) that they take
immediate steps, which ―should be deliberate, concrete and targeted
as clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations recognized in
the Covenant.‖55 None of these three requirements is subject to
progressive realization.
Thus the distinction between categories of rights on the basis of
immediate vs. progressive implementation is only partially accurate.
Most scholars and lawyers have accepted the reasoning of the
Committee that rights of both categories imply obligations to respect,
protect, promote, and provide. Which of these obligations looms
large depends on circumstances, not on categorical distinctions.
B. Justiciability
The reference to an ―effective remedy‖ in Article 2(3) of the
ICCPR without an equivalent in the ICESCR suggests that judicial
53. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm‘n on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights,
General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc.
E/1991/23/Annex III (Dec. 14, 1990), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
(symbol)/CESCR+General+comment+3.En?OpenDocument.
54. Id. ¶ 10.
55. Id. ¶ 2.
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remedies apply only to civil and political rights, making economic,
social, and cultural rights more ―programmatic‖ and ―aspirational.‖
In practice, the maturity of the judicial system and the way legislation
is drafted determine whether and how claims regarding legally
protected rights may be litigated, not whether the right protects
individual autonomy or ensures a social need. Indeed, the same
Article 2(3) refers to the determination of rights ―by competent
judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other
competent authority‖ and only requires States Parties ―to develop the
possibilities of judicial remedy; [and t]o ensure that the competent
authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.‖ Thus the
immediate justiciability of ICCPR rights is not required.
Many ESCR are protected by law, such as access to schools,
tenants‘ rights in housing, payment of benefits under a pension,
unemployment or other safety-net schemes, or access to health care.
While it is true that the state may not wish to create a cause of action
regarding a service that it is only beginning to put in place or may
consider that the market will provide the services through private
insurance schemes or supply and demand in labor or real estate, the
courts or the legislature may—and usually do—allow citizens and
sometimes aliens to sue in order to benefit from an appropriate
remedy when the state has failed in its obligation to respect, protect,
facilitate, or provide. Typically such litigation concerns the duty to
respect when the state has failed to provide a mandated service or has
discriminated against the plaintiff, or the duty to protect when the
state has failed to prevent a third party, such as a business enterprise,
from harming health through pollution or a dangerous product, or
failing to respect mandatory conditions of housing, or destroying or
damaging an object placed under the protection of national heritage,
to name obvious examples. In all these cases, the economic, social,
or cultural right in question may be considered to be justiciable. The
failure to provide a remedy, for example, in cases of alleged torture
or prolonged detention without charge, suggests that the justiciability
of civil and political rights is not always respected, even in advanced
democracies.
Some confusion might have existed in the first decades following
the entry into force of the ICESCR, when little comparative research
had been done on actual case law concerning ESCR. In recent
decades, a vast amount of case law has been collected so as to make
unsustainable the claim that justiciability attaches to CRP but not to
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ESCR, or not to the same degree. For example, a recent compilation
of essays documents nearly 2,000 judgments and decisions from
twenty-nine national and international jurisdictions covering such
issues as resettlement following eviction, regulation of private
medical plans, and state support to anti-poverty and illiteracy
programs, and addresses the extent to which economic, social, and
cultural rights are justiciable.56 The special rapporteurs on the rights
to adequate food, education and health have established or referred to
databases of case law in which the rights in question have been
adjudicated. In a general comment on domestic application of the
Covenant, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
considered that the view that judicial remedies were essential for
violations of CPR but not for ESCR was ―not warranted either by the
nature of the rights or by the relevant Covenant provisions.‖57 The
Committee concluded on this point:
The adoption of a rigid classification of economic, social and
cultural rights which puts them, by definition, beyond the
reach of the courts would thus be arbitrary and incompatible
with the principle that the two sets of human rights are
indivisible and interdependent. It would also drastically curtail
the capacity of the courts to protect the rights of the most
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society.58
A particularly telling example of the judicial examination of ESCR,
including allocation of resources, is provided by the Constitutional
Court of South Africa, which decided in the Soobramoney case in
1997 that ―the state has to manage its limited resources‖ and, in this
case of a man suffering kidney failure, would not require the state to
provide renal dialysis under the right to health because to do so ―the
health budget would have to be dramatically increased to the
prejudice of other needs which the state has to meet.‖59 Then, in
South Africa v Grootboom in 2000, the Court interpreted the right to
56. See SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW (Malcolm Langford ed., 2009); see also THE ROAD TO A REMEDY:
CURRENT ISSUES IN THE LITIGATION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (John
Squires, Malcolm Langford & Bret Thiele eds., 2005).
57. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights, General Comment No. 9: The Domestic Application of the Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1998/24 CESCR (Dec. 3, 1998).
58. Id.
59. Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) paras. 28,
31 (S. Afr.).
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adequate housing as requiring the state to ―provide relief for people
who have no access to land, no roof over their heads, and who are
living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations.‖60 For present
purposes it is worth highlighting the Court‘s dictum: ―The question is
therefore not whether socio-economic rights are jusiticiable under our
Constitution, but how to enforce them in a given case.‖61 In 2002, the
Court decided, in the landmark Treatment Action Campaign case,
that the constitutional guarantee of the right to health required the
government to provide to pregnant women a drug known to reduce
mother-to-child transmission of HIV, noting that the government
―has to find the resources‖ to comply with a court order and ―[w]here
a breach of any right has taken place, including a socio-economic
right, a court is under a duty to ensure that effective relief is
granted.‖62
The distinction of categories of human rights thus finds a
particularly weak justification on the ground that one category is
justiciable while the other is not. Clearly, the courts adjudicate
human rights of all types and categories depending on the domestic
incorporation of the international standard and the extent to which the
legal status of the right in question renders litigation possible and
practicable, as opposed to other available remedies.
C. Violations
Related to the justification of the distinction on grounds of
justiciability is the assumption that it is only appropriate to speak of
―violations‖ with respect to civil and political rights. The argument
here is that it is appropriate to apply a ―violations‖ approach to civil
and political rights, whereas a ―programmatic‖ approach is indicated
for economic, social, and cultural rights. However, the realization of

60. South Africa v Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para. 99 (S. Afr.).
61. Id. para. 20.
62. Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) para. 99 (S.
Afr.). In fact the court went beyond a declaratory order, stating:
We thus reject the argument that the only power that this Court has in the present
case is to issue a declaratory order. Where a breach of any right has taken place,
including a socio-economic right, a court is under a duty to ensure that effective
relief is granted. The nature of the right infringed and the nature of the
infringement will provide guidance as to the appropriate relief in a particular case.
Where necessary this may include both the issuing of a mandamus and the exercise
of supervisory jurisdiction.
Id. para. 106 (footnote omitted).
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civil and political rights cannot be limited to dealing with violations
and economic, social, and cultural rights can also be violated. Part of
the justification for the claim that a violations approach is not
appropriate for economic, social, and cultural rights is the assumption
that compliance with these rights is best assessed in terms of the
outcome of programs that are more or less effective in delivering the
services, whereas accountability for civil and political rights is a
matter of identifying and punishing those who violate these rights.
Certainly, a country that refuses to hold free and fair elections, a law
enforcement department that brutalizes suspects, a security policy
that engages in extraordinary rendition, prolonged detention without
charge, and torture, is guilty of violations of civil and political rights.
But this failure to realize civil and political rights also involves
inadequate training, failure to enact appropriate legislation and
similar measures for which it may not be easy to identify the dutyholder accountable for the failure to eliminate these abuses from the
system of criminal justice or the administration of elections. Along
with accountability for violations attributable to individuals is the
requirement that effective preventive programs reduce the incentives
to commit violations, which is best advanced through a cooperative
mode of encouraging, cajoling, assisting, or otherwise cooperating
with state officials to seek improvement of human rights performance. The choice between the violations and the cooperation
approach is a tactical matter for other governments, international
partners, and civil society organizations to assess. A government that
is willing to accept international assistance and cooperation to
improve the practice of its law enforcement officials may reject
accusations of responsibility for violations of the rights of detained or
incarcerated persons. Without denying the right to redress of alleged
victims of violation, there are advantages to walking through the
open door of cooperation, which may be slammed shut for those who
focus exclusively on public denunciation of violations. Thus, there
are situations in which CPR may be advanced more effectively
through the cooperation mode. Similarly, there are situations where
the promotion of ESCR, normally pursued in the cooperation mode,
may require a violations approach. When policies and practices that
are so ill-conceived and rife with corruption that they are the direct
cause of famine, epidemics of preventable disease, horrendous
working conditions, and similar grave abuses, they cross the line;
these acts and omissions are best treated as violations of economic,
social, and cultural rights.
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This matter was addressed by the Maastricht Guidelines on
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, drafted by a
group of more than thirty experts who met in Maastricht, the
Netherlands, from January 22–26, 1997 at the invitation of the
International Commission of Jurists (Geneva, Switzerland), the
Urban Morgan Institute on Human Rights (Cincinnati, Ohio, U.S.A.),
and the Centre for Human Rights of the Faculty of Law of Maastricht
University. More than a decade ago, the experts agreed that it was
―undisputed that all human rights are indivisible, interdependent,
interrelated and of equal importance for human dignity. Therefore,
states are as responsible for violations of economic, social and
cultural rights as they are for violations of civil and political rights.‖63
The Guidelines insist on treating violations the same for both
categories of rights: ―As in the case of civil and political rights, the
failure by a State Party to comply with a treaty obligation concerning
economic, social and cultural rights is, under international law, a
violation of that treaty.‖64 The Guidelines also applied the same
concept of obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill that is used for
civil and political rights, concluding with respect to economic, social,
and cultural rights that ―[f]ailure to perform any one of these three
obligations constitutes a violation of such rights.‖65 They further
clarified that ―a violation of economic, social and cultural rights
occurs when a State pursues, by action or omission, a policy or
practice which deliberately contravenes or ignores obligations of the
Covenant, or fails to achieve the required standard of conduct or
result.‖66
In the same spirit, the Guidelines defined the types of actions and
omissions that constitute violations of these rights, responsibilities,
and remedies, and recommended that ―[t]he optional protocol providing for individual and group complaints in relation to the rights
recognized in the Covenant should be adopted and ratified without
delay.‖67 It took nearly twelve more years for that recommendation
to be implemented. On Human Rights Day, December 10, 2008, the

63. International Comm‘n of Jurists (ICJ), Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶ 4 (Jan. 26, 1997), available at http://www.unhcr.
org/refworld/docid/48abd5730.html [hereinafter Maastricht Guidelines].
64. Id. ¶ 5.
65. Id. ¶ 6.
66. Id. ¶ 11.
67. Id. ¶ 31.
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General Assembly finally adopted the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.68
This act is a clear signal that there is no longer an expectation that
economic, social, and cultural rights need be treated differently from
civil and political with respect to violations.
D. Resources
The final—and perhaps most widely cited—basis for separating
the two categories is that of allocation of resources, according to
which civil and political rights, being negative and implying abstention by the state, do not require resources, whereas economic, social,
and cultural rights, being positive, are resource-dependent.
However, the weaknesses already discussed of the distinction
between negative and positive rights from a philosophical perspective
are particularly evident when it comes to resources. Comparing the
costs of programs to protect subsistence rights (ESCR) and security
rights (CPR), Henry Shue notes, ―Which program was more costly or
more complicated would depend upon the relative dimension of the
respective problems and would be unaffected by any respect in which
security is ‗negative‘ and subsistence is ‗positive.‘‖69
Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein, in The Cost of Rights: Why
Liberty Depends on Taxes, demonstrate how all rights require tax
payer-funded and government-managed services, whether courts, law
enforcement, administrative agencies, or other institutionalized
guarantees that the contract, property, liability-based, or other right
will be enforced. This argument cuts both ways for international
human rights. On the one hand, the principal message of their book
that ―private liberties have public costs,‖ and that ―all rights are
positive‖70 provides a convincing rebuttal to the argument that CPR
and ESCR are fundamentally different from the resource perspective.
On the other hand, they examine the costs of rights from the
perspective of the legal and economic system of the United States
and are somewhat dismissive of international human rights. The
―ostensibly legal rights guarantees‖ of international human rights

68. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 63/117, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 10, 2008).
69. SHUE, supra note 41, at 39.
70. STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY
DEPENDS ON TAXES 48 (1999).
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instruments are not worthy of consideration ―unless subscribing
national states—capable of taxing and spending—reliably support
international tribunals, such as those in Strasbourg or The Hague,
where genuine redress can be sought when such rights are violated.
―In practice,‖ they continue:
rights become more than mere declarations only if they confer
power on bodies whose decisions are legally binding (as the
moral rights announced in the United Nations Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948, for example, do not). As a general
rule, unfortunate individuals who do not live under a government capable of taxing and delivering an effective remedy
have no legal rights.71
Oddly they refer to redress from The Hague, which, if they have the
various criminal tribunals or the ICJ in mind, does not provide
―genuine redress‖ for individuals. They cite Article 13 of the
European Convention on Human Rights for the proposition that the
rights are ―reliably enforced when the subscribing states treat them as
part of domestic law.‖72 The fact is that most of the treaty
monitoring, whether by the regional human rights courts and
commissions or by the U.N. treaty bodies or by special procedures,
has to do with domestic incorporation of international human rights
norms, and many states parties, including poor countries, take very
seriously the need for legal remedies. On this point, the observations
made above on justiciability respond in part to Holmes‘ and Sunstein‘s dismissal of international human rights regimes that do not
meet their standard of ―government capable of taxing and delivering
an effective remedy.‖
Their presumed doubts that many countries can meet that standard
might be contrasted with their consideration of how the U.S. Supreme
Court interprets the Bill of Rights. They acknowledge that:
some important constitutional rights are plausibly styled as
duties of the government to forbear rather than to perform.
But even those ‗negative rights‘—such as prohibition on
71. Id. at 19. One may wonder to what tribunal in The Hague they refer since the ICJ
and the ICC or other penal tribunals located in that city do not deal with domestic application
of international human rights law. They probably did not have Dutch courts applying the
Covenants in mind, although they do constitute a good example of justicability of ESCR
since the Netherlands, like other countries having a monist system, applies the ICESCR
directly through its courts.
72. Id. at 237 n.5.

17 MARKS (DO NOT DELETE)

236

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

5/11/2009 2:35 PM

[Vol. 24:209

double jeopardy and excessive fines—will be protected only if
they find a protector, only if there exists a supervisory state
body, usually a court of some kind, able to force its will upon
the violators or potential violations of the right at issue.73
The issue does not even arise in many other jurisdictions since the
courts are expected to deal with allocation of resource issues that
affect the implementation of constitutionally protected ESCR derived
from international human rights, as the example from the Constitutional Court of South Africa cited above attests.74
In sum, the distinction between CPR and ESCR in international
human rights law on the grounds that, in general, the former are cost
free while the latter require state resources has lost its cogency, along
with the seven other bases for that categorical distinction discussed
above. To conclude, it may be useful to summarize, in the following
table, the main features which have been used to distinguish the two
categories and the core arguments which have progressively
challenged that distinction:

73. Id. at 53–54.
74. See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. There are undeniable difficulties in
enforcing the orders of the South African Constitutional Court but it is by far preferable that
human rights be protected under the Constitution and treaty obligations, affirmed by the
courts, and to struggle with effective enforcement, than to take as the starting point that
human rights involving positive duties have no place in the legal system.
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Features Traditionally Used to Distinguish Civil and Political from
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
Feature

Traditional
Traditional
Rationale for challenging
characteristic of
characteristic of
the distinction
civil and
economic, social,
political rights
and cultural rights
(CPR)
(ESCR)
A. FEATURES MAINLY OF A PHILOSOPHICAL OR CONCEPTUAL NATURE
Relative, responsive All rights emerge in a
to changing
historical context and take on
conditions
priority status when affirmed
as human rights.
Based on Western Based on models of All political systems, whether
Cultural bias
economic and
centrally planned
monarchy, democracy, or
political liberalism socialist system or socialist, provide for
Eastern enlightened constitutionally guaranteed
king
rights of people or citizens.
Positive rights
Varying degrees of the duties
Role of the state Negative rights
(freedom from state (claims to benefits to respect, protect, and fulfill
intervention), free from the state),
apply to all rights and make
markets
welfare state
the positive/negative
distinction of limited value in
defining the role of the state.
Freedom/autonomy Equality/solidarity Freedom requires both CPR
Underlying
and ESCR, and equality must
philosophical
be assured in relation to
objective
both, although the degree of
redistribution of resources
can vary.
B. FEATURES MAINLY OF A PRACTICAL OR POLICY-RELEVANT NATURE
Permanence

Absolute,
immutable

Immediate
Approach to
implementation implementation

Progressive
implementation

Availability of
Judicial
remedies

Justiciable

Political or
programmatic

Relation to
violations

Violations can be
identified and
denounced

Violations are
unsuitable to
cooperation mode

Allocation of
resources

Cost-free
Resources required
(individual
(welfare), rights as
freedom), rights as entitlements
immunities

Elements of immediate and
of progressive
implementation apply to all
rights in varying degrees.
All rights require remedies
and eventually become
justiciable as legal redress is
provided.
Both violations and
cooperation modes may be
appropriate for any given
right, depending on
circumstances.
Resources are needed for the
realization of CPR, and most
ESCR can be realized with
minimum investment.
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CONCLUSION
A holistic approach to the relations among CPR and ESCR avoids
misleading categorization of human rights, although the two Covenants, each devoted to one of the traditional categories, remain the
standard reference documents. The separation of human rights into
two categories appears to be discouraged by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and more recent formal texts that support
this holistic approach. The Universal Declaration, in Article 28,
refers to the right to ―a social and international order in which the
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully
realized.‖ The reference to a ―social and international order‖
suggests a concern for social structures conducive to the realization
of rights that cover the civil, cultural, economic, political, and social
domains. Such structures imply a holistic framework in which the
cumulative effect of realizing all types of human rights is a structural
change, that is, an altering of the power relations with the society.
The addition of the term ―international‖ means that the change in
power relations not only occurs with national societies but also at the
level of international relations and the international political economy. That is a reformist and perhaps a revolutionary aspiration in
the sense that full realization of both sets of human rights does imply
in most societies alteration of power relations. In the last analysis,
the transformation of human rights from their legitimate status of
morally justified entitlements to rights that are legally enforced and
enjoyed in practice, from capability to functioning, is the essential
project for human rights realization. The ―right‖ to the social and
international order described in Article 28 does not describe the
existing order but rather the potential order towards which a holistic
approach to human rights aspires.
Various formulations of the holistic approach appear in the
Declaration on the Right to Development,75 the Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action,76 the mandate of the High Commissioner

75. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, art. 6(2), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/41/128/Annex (Dec. 4, 1986) (―All human rights and fundamental freedoms are
indivisible and interdependent; equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to
the implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political, economic, social and
cultural rights.‖).
76. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 18, ¶ 5 (―All human rights
are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community
must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with
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for Human Rights,77 and in expert formulations such as the the
Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights.78 Beyond the reaffirmation that all human rights are
interdependent and interrelated, the holistic approach also recognizes
that both categories require resources, both can involve violations,
both require adaptation and often transformation of institutions and
practices, and both are essential for human dignity. The Human
Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme
for the year 2000 (HDR2000) dispels four myths about the two
categories of rights by clarifying that both categories include positive
and negative rights, involve immediate and progressive implementation, require resources, and require quantitative and qualitative
indicators.79 HDR2000 gives examples of how, in practice, the
exercise of civil and political rights has been instrumental in
empowering poor people and advancing economic, social, and
cultural rights. In the context of development, the holistic approach
means that all human rights, not just the right that appears most
relevant to the task at hand, must be considered. In urban planning,
for example, it is not enough to consider that the allocation of
resources to affordable housing is a contribution to the right to
shelter; the planner must ask what the plan will do for the residents‘
enjoyment of rights to health, food, education, information, work, and
effective remedies, to mention only the most obvious ones. The
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights assumes in its
training materials for staff and for national human rights institutions

the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and
various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of
States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all
human rights and fundamental freedoms.‖).
77. G.A. Res. 48/141, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/141 (Dec. 20, 1993) (stating that the
High Commissioner for Human Rights shall ―[b]e guided by the recognition that all human
rights—civil, cultural, economic, political and social—are universal, indivisible,
interdependent and interrelated and that, while the significance of national and regional
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in
mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to
promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms‖).
78. Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 62, ¶ 4 (―It is now undisputed that all human
rights are indivisible, interdependent, interrelated and of equal importance for human
dignity. Therefore, states are as responsible for violations of economic, social and cultural
rights as they are for violations of civil and political rights.‖).
79. U.N. Development Programme, Human Development Report 2000, at 93 box 5.5
(2000), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2000_EN.pdf.
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that the two main categories of human rights ―are not fundamentally
different from one another, either in law or in practice.‖80
Outside of the circles of academics, bureaucrats, and government
representatives who adhere to U.N. dogma, there is considerable
confusion regarding the separation of human rights into two categories. Numerous economists still hold the view that the end of
development is growth and market efficiency, or place an absolute
value on the free market. They look with suspicion on any government intervention and find human rights useful only to the extent that
they protect the right to property, and they find civil and political
liberties necessary because they are conducive to transparency and
accountability, which contribute to economic efficiency. They would
deem any use of economic, social, and cultural rights for the purpose
of redistribution as confusing rights with desires. Similarly some in
the human rights field consider that only civil and political rights,
encapsulating human freedom, are properly human rights and that the
promotion of economic, social, and cultural well-being may be a
useful agenda for government policy but not for human rights. In
sum, free-enterprise economists and the libertarian or conservative
rights theorists stress individual freedom and sanctity of property81
and reject the concept of economic, social, and cultural rights as
undermining human freedom and economic efficiency.
The alternative position is that ESCR are as fundamental to human
agency and dignity and as definitional of human existence and
fulfillment as CPR. ―[W]hen deprived of economic, social and
cultural rights,‖ the General Assembly affirmed in 1950, ―man does
not represent the human person whom the Universal Declaration
regards as the ideal of the free man.‖82 All governments have
formally recognized both sets of human rights in the Universal

80. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: HANDBOOK FOR NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTITUTIONS 3 (2005).
81. The argument that pro-growth policies based on economic freedom empower the
poor is made by Jean-Pierre Chauffour, in Pro-Human Rights Growth Policies, 7
DEVELOPMENT OUTREACH, Oct. 2006, http://www.devoutreach.com/oct06/SpecialReport/
tabid/1513/Default.aspx. This former senior economist at the IMF and current economic
advisor at the World Bank has developed these ideas in a recent book published by the Cato
Institute. See JEAN-PIERRE CHAUFFOUR, THE POWER OF FREEDOM: UNITED DEVELOPMENT
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2009).
82. G.A. Res. 421E (V), U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Dec. 4, 1950).
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Declaration and constantly reaffirmed that all human rights are
universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. The separation
during the Cold War between categories of rights was fraught with
ideological overtones, most of which have dissipated with the end of
East–West ideological confrontation. It is true, as David Beetham
insightfully put it:
Although in theory the end of the Cold War could have
provided an opportunity for ending the sterile opposition
between the two sets of human rights, in practice it has
reinforced the priorities of the U.S.A., the country which has
been most consistently opposed to the idea of economic and
social rights.83
He is correct that the United States Government
believes that while the progressive realization of Economic,
Social and Cultural rights requires government action, these
rights are not an immediate entitlement to a citizen. Sovereign
states should determine—through open, participatory debate
and democratic processes—the combination of policies and
programs they consider will be most effective in progressively
realizing the needs of their citizens.84
Nevertheless, the U.S. return to multilateralism and membership in
the Human Rights Council under the Obama Administration may
diminish the impact of U.S. exceptionalism regarding ESCR. Many
responses to concerns expressed by the skeptics, including U.S.
government lawyers, may be found in the general comments of the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,85 in debates
among the leading scholars and practitioners,86 and in the practice of
83. David Beetham, What Future for Economic and Social Rights, 43 POL. SYS. 41, 43
(1995).
84. See David Hohman, U.S. Delegate, Statement Before the 61st Commission on
Human Rights: Explanation of Vote (Apr. 15, 2005), available at http://www.usmission.ch/humanrights/2005/0415Item10L27.htm. U.S. NGOs and most academics do not
accept this interpretation. See, for example, the work of the Center for Economic and Social
Rights, http://www.cesr.org, and the Poor People‘s Economic Human Rights Campaign,
www.economichumanrights.org (both last visited Apr. 17, 2009).
85. The texts of the nineteen General Comments issued so far are available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/comments.htm.
86. See Mary Robinson, Advancing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: The Way
Forward, 26 HUM RTS. Q. 866 (2004); Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an International Human Rights Organization, 26
HUM RTS. Q. 63 (2004).
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international institutions and bilateral aid programs that have
successfully applied a human rights-based approach to their work in
the fields of education, health, social security, labor, housing, and
other domains of economic, social, and cultural rights. In many parts
of the world a willingness to work for ESCR adds legitimacy to
efforts to promote CPR.
Twenty-first century human rights thinking has evolved beyond
the Cold War divide and ―the sterile opposition between the two sets
of human rights.‖ The conceptual distinctions based on permanence,
cultural bias, the role of the state, and political philosophy have lost
their cogency since rights in both categories build on a shared
understanding of core values of freedom, autonomy, equality and
solidarity at a particular historical moment and provide a standard of
achievement that transcends and builds on the best features of
capitalism and socialism, in a world where neither is feasible in its
pure form. The practical grounds for treating the two groups
differently based on modes of implementation, including the use of
the courts, reference to violations, and allocation of resources, have
also lost their cogency since both sets of human rights require
immediate and progressive measures, both have justiciable and
programmatic elements, both are advanced by reference to cooperation and violations, and both involve the use in varying degrees of
action by and resources of the state.
The human rights agenda sixty years after the adoption of the
UDHR calls for a translation of the rhetorical commitment to a
holistic and integrated approach to human rights into the further
development of tools of implementation, monitoring, measuring, and
thinking common to both sets of human rights. The trends among
treaty bodies, U.N. agencies, and NGOs are clearly moving in that
direction. The aim of this article has been to suggest the implications
of these trends for the restoration of the unity of human rights that
has been put into question since 1951. The essence of human rights
is to define priorities based on what is most valued by the society.
The values represented by one set of human rights are no less
valuable than those of the other, including under times of stress when
national security or economic prosperity are threatened and under
attack. Human rights function to provide a bulwark against the
temptation to sacrifice anyone‘s freedom or subsistence in response
to such stress. Under any given circumstance, the urgency and
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effective means of implementation will vary from one right to the
next. The false dichotomy of ESCR and CPR has outlived its
usefulness. It is time to move on to a more holistic and integrated
understanding and practice of human rights.

